Resistance to Military Conscription or
Forced Recruitment by Insurgents
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While other nations rely on internationalprinciples to interpret
treaty-derived terms in statutes governing refugee matters, the
United States Supreme Court has, in recent cases, ignored this
convention in taking a restrictive approach to refugee protection.
By narrowly construing the term "'politicalopinion" and unduly
focussing on the persecutor's state of mind, the Court has limited
the scope of protectionfor thousands of legitimate asylum seekers. The decisions of a number of relevant foreign tribunals show
that the Supreme Court's rationale runs contrary to established
international standards. This Article urges Congress to bring the
doctrinal position of the United States back into conformity with
internationalstandards and comparative jurisprudence.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Refugees are an inevitable consequence of war. However, not all
of those who are displaced by conflict have an individualized fear of
persecution as required by the international refugee treaties.1 Indeed, many are likely to be fleeing from generalized risks of harm
occasioned by being caught in the cross fire. This Article discusses
* Columbia College, A.B., 1971; New York University, J.D., 1976. Mr. Helton is
a member of the New York Bar and directs the Refugee Project of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, with offices in New York City.
1. See infra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.

certain instances in which claims for refugee protection could be recognized, even though they are asserted in the context of armed con-

flict and based on objection to participation in the conflict.
Initially, the role of state practice in the interpretation of the

multi-lateral refugee treaties is addressed, followed by a discussion
of recent United States jurisprudence on resistance to forced recruitment by insurgents as a basis for refugee protection. The international law context is then set out and recent comparative
jurisprudential perspectives on resistance to military service as a basis for asylum are examined in detail. Finally, lessons for United
States courts and policy-makers are presented.
II.

THE ROLE OF STATE PRACTICE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE MULTI-LATERAL REFUGEE TREATIES

State practice is a well-established aid in the interpretation of
multi-lateral treaties. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees2 or its 1967 Protocol' are good examples. According to the
1951 Convention, a refugee is one who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
4 such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.

The Refugee Act of 19801 uses a definition "virtually identical to
the one prescribed by international law." 6 According to this Act, a
refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.7
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
3. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force by the United States on November 1, 1968)
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
4. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees incorporates this
definition, removing temporal and geographic limitations. Refugee Protocol, supra note
3, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
5. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6. Arthur C. Helton, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Decision and Its Implications,
16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 40 (1987-88).
7. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
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Congress adopted this definition to "conform United States domestic
law to the standards of the U.N. Protocol to which the United States
acceded in 1968."1 However, while the goal of Congress was conformity with an international standard,9 none of the three United
States Supreme Court decisions concerning the refugee definition
under the Refugee Act examined foreign jurisprudence in the course
of explicating treaty-derived terms.1 0
In contrast, the English House of Lords analyzed United States
jurisprudence in its determination of an appeal involving the refusal
of asylum applications to six Sri Lankan Tamils." The issue before
the House of Lords was the proper interpretation of the definition of
the term "refugee" in the Convention. In its decision, the House
of Lords analyzed two United States Supreme Court cases 2 regarding the proper test for determining a "well-founded fear of
persecution."' 3
The House of Lords' decision and a United States Supreme Court
decision were thereafter both discussed by the High Court of Australia. 14 Interpreting the treaty terms "well-founded fear of persecution," the Australian court concluded that both English and United
States jurisprudence "establish[ed] that a fear may be well-founded
for the purpose of the Convention and the Protocol even though persecution is unlikely to occur,"' 5 noting that "an international convention should be interpreted

.

.

.

'on broad principles of general

acceptation.' ",16
Interpretation through the use of generally accepted international
principles is applied in many areas of law. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed the sources by which fo determine

8. Helton, supra note 6, at 39.

9. Id. at 44.

10. See INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (interpreting "political
opinion"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (interpreting "well-founded
fear of persecution"); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (interpreting "well-founded
fear of persecution").
11. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Sivakumaran,
[1988] 1 All E.R. 193 (1987).
12. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987).
13. Ex parte Sivakumaran, [1988] 1 All E.R. at 197.
14. Chan Yee Kin v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 87 A.L.R. 412
(1989) (Austl.).
15. Id. at 448.
16. Id. at 435-36 (quoting James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd., 1978 App. Cas. 141, 152.

the intent of treaty parties. 17 In that case, in the course of determining the scope of liability by an international air carrier for injuries to
passengers under the Warsaw Convention, the Court found it appropriate to refer initially to the text of the instrument. The Court explained that ambiguities can be resolved by resort to extrinsic
sources, such as legislation, judicial decisions, and scholarly writing. 8 Additional aids to construction include the negotiating history
of the treaty, commentaries, post-decision conduct, such as entry into
subsequent international agreements that clarify treaty provisions,
and the judicial decisions of other state parties.'0
Apart from the United States, the courts of other countries also
stress the need to respect shared expectations and use foreign jurisprudence to aid them in treaty interpretation. In one case, the House
of Lords20 noted that because the "expressed objective" of a provision regulating commerce was to "produce uniformity in all contracting States" the English court should not be constrained by
English legal precedent."'
Another example of resort to comparative jurisprudence is found
in a Canadian case 22 in which the Canadian Tax Court relied heavily on foreign jurisprudence. In that case, the Canadian court needed
to determine the meaning of a term in a Canada-United States tax
treaty. Because there was no Canadian jurisprudence on this topic,
the Canadian court examined British, Australian, and United States
jurisprudence.23 The court specifically reviewed a United States
Court of Appeals case in which the facts were similar and another
United States court decision which "explicitly and specifically
17. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
18. Id. at 1493-97.
19. "We must also consult the opinions of our sister signatories in searching for the
meaning of [the disputed treaty term]." Id. at 1501. In Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985), the Supreme Court, in examining foreign jurisprudence in its search for the correct interpretation of another term used in the Warsaw Convention, explained that because "'[treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements,'" it is necessary
to "'look beyond the written words to . . . the practical construction adopted by the
parties'" in order to "'ascertain'" the meaning of the treaty. Id. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)). Looking beyond
the written words, the Court concluded that the term in question, as used in French
cases, "parallels" its use in British and American jurisprudence. Id. at 400. The Court
specifically cited French jurisprudence, id., observing that the holding of this case is in
"accord with American decisions," id. at 404, and that the opinions of sister signatories
are "'entitled to considerable weight.'" Id. (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
20. James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd., 3
W.L.R. 907 (1977) (Eng.).
21. Id. The House of Lords concluded that as there was "no universal wisdom
available across the channel" the English court was required to resort to customary domestic law methods for interpreting the term in question. Id.
22. Shere v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, 1989 C.T.C. 2286 (Can.).
23. Id. at 2290.
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agreed with [the prior decision]" 24 to identify the rule for its
decision.
The examination of foreign jurisprudence by courts interpreting

common terms under the Refugee Convention and Protocol should
thus be a standard, not an occasional exercise. 25 When treaty-de-

rived terms are used in a statute, as in the Refugee Act, the decisions of "sister signatories" are appropriate sources of statutory

interpretation.
III.

RECENT UNITED STATES JURISPRUDENCE

In 1992 the United States Supreme Court decided a case2 involv27
ing forced recruitment by insurgents as a basis for political asylum.
The case concerned Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias, a Guatemalan
man who was apprehended by United States immigration authorities
in July 1987 and held for deportation proceedings.2" He applied for

asylum in the United States29 and withholding of deportation 0 to
Guatemala.

His claims for protection were based on an incident in January
1987 when two armed, masked guerrillas came to his home. The

insurgents asked his parents and him to join the group, but they refused. The insurgents told them that they would be back. Mr. Elias-

Zacarias was afraid that government forces would retaliate against
24. Id. at 2292.
25. This Article concerns treaty interpretation, not treaty application. The United
States Constitution declares that treaties are among sources that comprise the "supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829), overruled by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1883). Also,
the incorporation of the treaty definition of "refugee" into the Refugee Act of 1980 resolves any issues of applicability. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
26. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
27. See Karen Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should
Provide Refuge to Young Men Who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 849 (1989), for a review of United States case law prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias.
28. Elias-Zacharias,112 S. Ct. at 814.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border
or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may
be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General
determines that such an alien is a refugee." See supra note 7 and accompanying text for
the definition of "refugee" under the United States statute.
30. 8 U.S.C. §1253 (h)(1) (1988) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

him and his family if he joined the anti-government guerrillas. He
thereupon left Guatemala in March 1987.31
The issue for decision, according to the Supreme Court, was
whether "a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into
performing military service necessarily constitutes 'persecution on
account of

. .

. political opinion' under . . . [the Refugee Act of

1980]."Il The affirmative answer to the question given by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was based on the rationale that "the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a
political opinion hostile to the persecutor" 33-which the Supreme
Court regarded as "untrue"-and "because the persecutor's motive
in carrying out the kidnapping is political," which the Supreme
Court found "irrelevant." 34
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, was
pointed in his analysis:
The record in the present case not only failed to show political motive on
Elias-Zacarias' part: it showed the opposite. He testified that he refused to
join the guerrillas because he was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and his family if he did so. Nor is there any indication
(assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based."

The Court emphasized that the ordinary meaning of the phrase
"persecution on account of ... political opinion" refers to the victim,
not the persecutor. 38 As the Court explained: "Thus, the mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas'
forced recruitment is inadequate to establish (and, indeed, goes far
to refute) the proposition that
Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on
' ' 37
account of political opinion.
As to the argument by Mr. Elias-Zacarias that his neutrality in
not taking sides with any political faction affirmatively expressed
political opinion, the Court was dubious: "Even if it does, EliasZacarias still has to establish that the record also compels the conclusion that he has a 'well-founded fear' that the guerrillas will
persecute him because of that political opinion rather than because
of his refusal to fight with them."3 8
The United States Supreme Court in the Elias-Zacariascase has
thus taken a relatively restrictive approach to refugee protection for
31.

Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 814-15.

32. Id. at 814.
33. Id. at 815 (quoting Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990)).
34. Id.
35. Id.

36. Id. (construing 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42)(B)).
37. Id. at 816.
38. Id. This specific intent requirement does not require "direct proof of his persecutor's motives" but "some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial." Id. at 816-17.
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those who would be punished for resisting forced recruitment by insurgents. 3 The Court would presumably take a similarly narrow approach where the persecutor is governmental in character and the
claim is based on punishment for resistance to military service for
reasons of conscience.4 0 International and comparative perspectives,
however, do not support such an approach.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

A.

InternationalDoctrinal Context

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR):
the necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim
to refugee status, i.e., when a person can show that the performance of
military service would have required his participation in military action
contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid
reasons of conscience.4

No demonstration of a persecutor's motivation to harm a conscientious objector is required. What matters is the impact of the government's act-the denial to the objector of his or her freedom of
religion or conscience.4 2 Thus, in cases concerning the general application of a law such as conscription where no alternative to military
39. The Board of Immigration Appeals of the United States Department of Justice
has extended this restrictive analysis in a precedent decision concerning a claim of persecution on account of political opinion by a Tamil asylum applicant. In re T, No. 3187
(BIA Oct. 13, 1992) (interim decision) (on file with author).
40. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the lower court's decision
in Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), and remanded the case for
consideration in light of Elias-Zacarias. INS v. Canas-Segovia, 112 S.Ct. 1152 (1992).
The Canas-Segovia case involves claims for asylum for two Salvadoran brothers who
sought to resist governmental military service on account of their religious beliefs as
Jehovah Witnesses. Id.
41. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES [hereinafter

HANDBOOK]. The Handbook has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court
to be a useful source of guidance on the explication of the refugee definition. INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987). The United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible to supervise the application of the international
refugee treaties. See also Refugee Convention, supra note 2, Preamble; Refugee Protocol, supra note 3, art. 11 V 2.
42. Of course, just because a person evades military service does not make him or
her a refugee. "A person is clearly not a refugee if his only reason for desertion or draftevasion is his dislike of military service or fear of combat." HANDBOOK, supra note 41,
q 168. Moreover, not every asylum claimant who objects to military service for reasons
of conscience will be a refugee. As the UNHCR makes clear, an applicant claiming to be
an objector of conscience must demonstrate the sincerity of his or her convictions: "The

service exists, the persecutor's motivation may be both unnecessary

and irrelevant in establishing a well-founded fear of persecution
based on an individual's beliefs.43

Also, the UNHCR has specifically recognized that a military resister may be considered a refugee if he or she can show a risk of
disproportionately severe punishment for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, social group membership, or political opinion. 4" The inquiry on this ground concerns the objective indicia of the gravity of
the punishment imposed, quite apart from the persecutor's state of
mind.
B.

Comparative Jurisprudence

Relatively recent decisions of municipal tribunals of other Convention and Protocol signatories demonstrate that an undue focus on the
persecutor's state of mind is unwarranted. These authorities hold
that, regardless of the persecutor's motivation, disregard of an individual's religious or political beliefs or the imposition of disproportionately harsh punishment can amount to persecution.
1.

Canada4"

The Canadian Immigration Appeal Board 46 granted asylum to a
Jehovah's Witness from El Salvador who refused to serve in the military because of his "strongly held conscientious objections to taking
gdnuineness of a person's political, religious or moral convictions, or of his reasons of
conscience for objecting to performing military service, will of course need to be established by a thorough investigation of his personality and background. The fact that he
may have manifested his views prior to being called to arms, or that he may already have
encountered difficulties with the authorities because of his convictions, are relevant considerations. Whether he has been drafted into compulsory service or joined the army as a
volunteer may also be indicative of the genuineness of his convictions." Id. 1 174.
43. See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-35
(1983). See also I ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN. THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 231-66 (1966).
44. HANDBOOK, supra note 41, %169. The UNHCR recognizes that an application
for refugee protection need not demonstrate that he or she is at risk because of an opinion actually held where the persecutor attributes an intolerable opinion to him or her, Id.
%80.
45. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY. THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 179-84
(1991) for a discussion of early Canadian decisions on the issue.
46. Until relatively recently, the Immigration Appeal Board (lAB) of Canada, the
highest administrative tribunal concerned with immigration matters, determined refugee
appeals. In 1989, however, the lAB was restructured under a new name, the Immigration
and Refugee Board, and its separate functions are now divided between the Convention
Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) and the Immigration Appeal Division. The
Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 28 (Supp. 4 1985) (Can.). The Canadian administrative
cases discussed in this Article are cited by name when possible, but it has been the recent
practice of the CRDD to delete identifying information from publicly released decisions
in order to protect individuals and their family members. Such cases are cited by docket
number and date.
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human life." 41 The Canadian Board determined that the requirement of military service could amount to persecution, explaining:
It matters little that [the applicant] is subjected to the same conscription
laws or practices as other young men of military age who are without such
scruples; the issue is not equal treatment, but fear of persecution .... Were

[the applicant] required to enter the military and undertake military duties
which would deeply offend his8 sensibilities, he would, in the Board's opinion, be suffering persecution."

The Canadian Board in this case also addressed the question of
"whether the cause of the fear [of persecution] is by reason of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,"' 9 and found that the applicant suffered persecution
"by reason of religion." The Board explained:
It is the religion of [the applicant] that is at the root of his convictions and
scruples. For the fear of persecution to exist, the state need not deliberately
search out such people for systematic and conscious persecution; indeed,
here the state apparently allows the witnesses of Jehovah to practice their
religion in their Halls without hinderance. However, the Board finds a systematic persecution by reason of religion. It is the failure of the recruiting
system to make allowances for the convictions of the conscientious objector
that forms the basis of the fear. Such a failure amounts to fear of persecution within the meaning of the Act."

The Board did not require evidence of the state's intent to punish the
applicant for being a Jehovah's Witness. "Systematic persecution"

that forces an individual to commit acts that are abhorrent to his or
her beliefs would suffice to justify refugee protection.

In a variety of decisions, Canadian courts and administrative bodies have granted asylum to applicants who were perceived as political
enemies simply because they refused to perform military duty.5 1 In
one case, the applicant refused to report for military duty because he
objected to human rights abuses perpetuated by the Salvadoran
army. 52 The applicant had testified that he had never been politically
47. Ramirez v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, No. V86-6161 at 4
(IAB May 5, 1987) (on file with author).
48.

Id.

49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. The Canadian Immigration Act, 1976, reads:
"Convention refugee" means any person who (a) by reason of a well-founded
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion, (i) is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country.
The Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 35, § 1(2) (1988).
51. See, e.g., Abarca v. Ministry of Employment and Immigration, No. W864030-W (lAB Mar. 21, 1986) (on file with author).
52. Id. at 2, 6.

active 3 and there was no evidence indicating that the applicant
feared he "would be detained, tortured and beaten, or killed" for his
unwillingness to serve in the military.54 Nevertheless, the Canadian
Board held that the applicant's fear was "one of persecution, not
mere prosecution." 55 The Board found that the applicant's refusal to
serve "has been perceived as a serious56or threatening act of political
opposition to the system as a whole."
In another case involving a Salvadoran who feared severe punishment for his desertion from the army, the Canadian Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) reviewed international7
authorities to determine the eligibility of the applicant for asylum.
The CRDD held that the applicant's refusal to serve would be considered to be not merely a breach of the law, but an act of disloyalty
to the government. Such deserters are labelled "subversives" and
"guerrilla supporters." The resulting punishment could be torture or
death.5 The CRDD concluded that the applicant was "a Convention
refugee by reason of his political opinion" because "the possible excessive punishment of torture and death would not be for the act of
desertion but for the perceived political act taken against the
government." 59
The Canadian authorities do not recognize "draft evaders" or
"military deserters" per se as refugees. Instead, the tribunals have
examined whether punishment for disobedience is consistent with
standards of fundamental fairness. 0 For example, the Canadian
CRDD granted asylum to an Iraqi citizen who feared execution as a
military deserter if he returned to Iraq.," The CRDD held that, although fear of punishment "solely for refusal to perform military
service" is not considered persecution:
[i]t
has however been recognized internationally that when the refusal to
perform military service stems from sincere personal or religious conviction,
or an unwillingness to participate in internationally condemned acts of violence, or where the punishment for refusal to perform service0 2is disproportionately severe, this punishment may amount to persecution.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.

57.

No. T89-05407 at 3-4, 6 (CRDD 1990) (on file with author).

58.

Id. at 5.

59. Id.; accord Padilla v. Canada, F.C. No. 71 (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file with author); No. T89-01690 (CRDD Jan. 8, 1990) (on file with author). There is only one
Federal Court of Appeals in Canada.
60. Cf Musial v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, I F.C. 290, 38 N.R.
55 (1982) (punishment faced for refusal to serve in Polish military constituted only prosecution, not persecution).
61. No. V89-00924 at 3 (CRDD June 8, 1990) (on file with author).
62. Id. at 5 (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 41, 11 167-74).
590.
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Based on evidence that the applicant feared that he would be executed because the government would consider him a political enemy
of the regime for his refusal to serve, the CRDD determined that the
applicant "has established a well-founded fear of persecution for
reason of his political opinion (as perceived by the Iraqi

government) ."63
Similarly, the CRDD held in another case

4

that although the ap-

plicant, an Afghan national, had never demonstrated strong political
convictions, "his refusal to join in the fighting on the government's
side [in civil war] could be perceived by the government as an oppos-

ing political statement" for which the applicant faced "dispropor-

tionately severe punishment." 65 On this basis, the CRDD granted

political asylum. 66

In the only case found involving nongovernmental agents of perse-

cution, the Canadian CRDD granted asylum to an applicant

threatened by these agents of persecution. 67 In that case, the appli-

cant, a Lebanese national, went into hiding after he had been ordered to join the Amal militia by armed individuals. The applicant

refused to join the militia because he knew that the militia killed

innocent civilians.6 8 Recognizing that the applicant's refusal to join

the militia was for "valid reasons of conscience" and that the applicant's "life was at stake because he refused to join," 69 the Canadian
CRDD held that the applicant was eligible for asylum. 0 Unlike the

63. No. V89-00924 at 4, 6 (CRDD June 8, 1990) (on file with author).
64. No. T89-01610 (CRDD July 1989) (on file with author).
65. Id. at 5.
66. Persecution for imputed political opinion is not limited, of course, to cases that
involve individuals refusing to perform military service. In Hilo v. Canada, F.C.J. No.
228 (March 15, 1991) (on file with author), the asylum applicant was a Syrian national
who was part of a charitable religious group that actively raised funds to send food to
needy people in Lebanon. Syrian police, suspicious of the group's intentions, warned the
group to stop meeting, then beat and imprisoned one member of the group who had
attempted to explain the group's philanthropic motivation. The court found that the Syrian security forces persecuted the group because they thought it was "politically motivated against the government and thus politically undesirable." Id. at 4. In this case,
there was no nexus between the views of the applicant and the views attributed to him by
the authorities. Nonetheless, the court held that the applicant was persecuted on account
of political opinion and was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.
67. No. M89-00149 (CRDD Feb. 20, 1989) (on file with author).
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 3. In most instances, of course, nongovernmental agents of persecution
are less likely to have an established justice system capable of applying the rule of law to
individuals who refuse to be forcibly recruited.
70. Id. at 4.

United States Supreme Court, the CRDD did not examine the subjective motivation of the persecutor to determine whether the persecutor's disagreement with the victim's particular beliefs was the
specific cause of the persecution. 7 '
2.

United Kingdom

Tribunals in the United Kingdom have also recognized that an
individual can, in some instances, be eligible for asylum due to a
form of systematic persecution, as when South African citizens have
faced punishment for refusal to serve in the military because of the
individual's abhorrence of apartheid. Three such United Kingdom
cases are described by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 72 The tribunal explained that when the law of the land involves "a course of
conduct abhorrent to a fundamental concept of our society[J any
sanctions imposed to enforce it may amount to persecution, provided
the refusal to carry out the course of conduct was based on a ground
specified by the Immigration Rules." '73 Reflecting the protection 7of4
fundamental human rights implicated by the Refugee Convention
and Protocol,75 the tribunal thus recognized that a government can
persecute an individual on account of his or her beliefs merely by
enforcing a law of general application. 76
Tribunals in the United Kingdom have also recognized that punishment for noncompliance with a law compelling military service
can "amount to persecution ...

if a State ...

exceed[s] that which

is thought to be acceptable limits in enforcement because of its national interests. '7 7 Regardless of whether the state knows of and disagrees with a victim's opinion or conviction that causes that
71. Id. at 3.
72. Matkov v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Appeal No. TH/106300/83
(3331) at 3 (1984) (on file with author).
73. Id. at 5. The United Kingdom Immigration Rules state:
A person may apply for asylum in the United Kingdom on the ground that, if
he were required to leave, he would have to go to a country to which he is
unwilling to go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. Any such claim is to be carefully considered in the light of all the
relevant circumstances.
Id. at 1.
74. Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
75. Refugee Protocol, supra note 3.
76. The United Kingdom tribunal did not go as far as the Canadian Board. See
supra text accompanying note 67. The tribunal in Matkov contrasted the South African
cases with Doonetas v. Secretary of State, Appeal No. TH/12339/75 (820) (1976) (tribunal held that an individual was not necessarily eligible for asylum because he objected
to miliary service based on his religious beliefs) (on file with author). Matkov, No. TH/
106300/83, at 6. The tribunal specifically stated that the South African cases qualified
Doonetas in stressing that persecution can result from a law of general application involving abhorrent conduct. Id.
77. Id. at 7. See also R. v. Secretary of the State for the Home Dep't ex parte
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individual to breach a legal duty, punishment for that breach can
constitute persecution."8
3.

Germany

The highest Administrative Court in Germany79 granted asylum
to an individual whose religious convictions did not permit him to
bear arms. 0 The court found that the asylum applicant
was involved in a conflict between two duties: on the one hand, the State
required him to perform military service; on the other hand, his religion
required him to refrain from such service for reasons of conscience. If the
State takes action against the person involved in such a conflict, the effect
as far as he is concerned is persecution because of his religion.81

In focusing on the perspective of the asylum applicant, the court
thus did not explicitly require proof of the persecutor's subjective
motivation, unlike the United States Supreme Court.
German tribunals have granted asylum in circumstances similar to
those described in the Canadian cases. The Bavarian Administrative
Court, Ansbach, in 1988 recognized that a valid asylum claim can
be based on fear of extrajudicial punishment for reasons of perceived
political opposition.82 That case involved an Ethiopian applicant
from the province of Tigre who had refused to serve in the military.
Binbasi, 1989 Imm AR 595, 599 (Eng.) (Although asylum cannot be granted simply
because applicant is unable to "enjoy the full range of freedoms he would enjoy" in the
United Kingdom, "a judgment has to be made as to whether the interference with freedom is sufficiently serious to merit asylum.").
78. The British courts have, in other circumstances, found that punishment for
breach of a law of general application does not constitute persecution, but those cases did
not involve either (1) legal obligations to engage in abhorrent conduct or (2) disproportionate punishment for the breach. See Atibo v. Immigration Officer, 1978 Imm AR 93
(Eng.) (applicant was not persecuted simply because he would be punished in
Mozambique if he proselytized in public in violation of law prohibiting all public meetings). The distinction featured in Atibo is reflected as well in international human rights
law, which includes refugee law. See Arthur C. Helton, What is Refugee Protection?,2
INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 119 (Special Issue 1990). The exercise of freedom of expression
(given virtually unqualified protection under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution) is subject to certain restrictions regarding the protection of national security and public order. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23,
1967, art. 19(3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
79. Administrative courts hear all the cases involving administrative law matters in
Germany. The highest administrative court is the German Federal Administrative Court
in Berlin.
80. BVerwG IC 41.60, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, LEGAL BULL. No. 6 (1962) (trans. 1981) (on file with author).
81. Id.
82. People v. Federal Republic of Germany, VG (AN 19 K 87.35820) (Markus B.
Heyder trans., 1988) (on file with author).

Evidence indicated that the government would likely detain, torture,
or execute the applicant solely for suspicion of political opposition, 83a
suspicion based on the individual's refusal to serve in the military.
4. Austria
Austrian law also recognizes that an individual who objects to military service based on convictions of conscience may be a refugee.
Interpreting the Austrian Asylum Law of 1968, the Federal Ministry of the Interior in 1975 issued a regulation which states that an
individual is eligible for asylum if that individual (1) refuses to serve
in the military for Convention reasons and (2) is permitted no option
to perform civilian rather than miliary service. 84 The rule recognized
that severe punishment would ordinarily follow for such a refusal to
serve.8 5 The elements of this Austrian regulation evince a concern
with the impact of the punishment visited upon the individual, rather
than with the persecutors' state of mind.
V.

CONCLUSION

A persecutor's desire to overcome an individual's actual belief is
not always necessary to establish a well-founded fear on the part of
military resisters. Alternatively, the objector of conscience may
demonstrate that his or her convictions "are not taken into account
by the authorities in requiring him to perform military service" 86
and that "but for" such sincere convictions he or she would not be at
risk of serious harm. Others who resist military service may show
that disproportionately severe punishment may result from a refusal
to serve and that refugee protection is thus warranted. Such an interpretation of persecution "for reasons of" a political opinion accords with the guidance provided by the specialized United Nations
agency charged with supervising the application of the Convention
and Protocol as well as "sister signatories" of the refugee treaties.
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in EliasZacarias may preclude protection for thousands of asylum seekers
given the restrictive interpretation of the term "political opinion." 87
83. Id.; see also Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, No. 43801986-88 (1988) and No. 438-01318-86 (1986) (Markus B. Heyder trans., 1988) (on file
with author) (applicants granted asylum where they faced significant punishment for
refusal to serve in the Iraqi army).
84. Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior Regulation on Deserters and Draft
Evaders, Z1.22.50 -IIC/75 at 3-4 (Markus B. Heyder trans., 1975) (on file with
author).
85. Id.
86. HANDBOOK, supra note 41,
172.
87. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Political Asylum Claims, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at A20, col. I.
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Such a limited approach is disfavored by international standards and

comparative jurisprudence. 8
Essentially, these authorities would promote the notion that resistance to compulsory military service, including forced recruitment by
insurgents, can be a basis for a claim of refugee protection, particularly when the penalties imposed for such resistance are disproportionate89 or when such service may involve participation in the
systematic violation of fundamental human rights.
For adjudicators to focus on the specific intent to persecute and on
the reasons for persecution as exclusionary elements may therefore
unduly narrow the scope of refugee protection." Such an intent
would often be difficult to establish, even indirectly from the circumstances, when other plausible objectives could be attributed to a persecutor-for example, raising military forces, or enforcing discipline
in guerrilla groups. Such deferential treatment by the Court in
Elias-Zacariaswas unwarranted and should not be adopted in other
jurisdictions or extended unnecessarily to the judicial review of other
types of asylum decisions in the United States. 9 '
Given the divergence between international standards and comparative jurisprudence and the current United States doctrinal position,
it may be incumbent upon Congress through legislation, or upon the
agency responsible for implementation through the rule-making
power, 2 to clarify criteria and the ambit of protection available
88. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the language and purpose of the
Refugee Convention compel a liberal, as opposed to a restrictive, interpretation. A restrictive construction, according to this commentator, is nothing less than a "political"
choice. See Walter K5lin, Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation?,3
INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 435 (1991).
89. Surely such a claim could be established when the nature of harm feared is
extrajudicial execution.
90. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States
Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 5 (1991) (arguing that too much emphasis is
placed by adjudicators on identifying the cause of persecution in United States practice).
91. See Bret I. Parker, Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Elias-Zacarias: A Departurefrom the Past, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1275, 1312 (199192). The Ninth Circuit took such a limiting approach recently when it remanded the case
of Jose Canas-Segovia to the Board of Immigration Appeals holding that, while the Supreme Court's persecutory motive requirement applies to claims based on religious as
well as political grounds, claims based on attributed political opinion continue to be cognizable. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992). Claims of persecution on
account of opinion imputed to a persecutor for resistance to military service thus remain
available in the United States. Id. This conclusion is strengthened by a recent agency
interpretation. See INS Op. Gen. Counsel, Continued Validity of the Doctrine of Imputed Political Opinion (Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with the author).
92. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in 1991 petitioned the United
States Department of Justice seeking a rule on substantive eligibility criteria for refugee

under the refugee definition. Such clarification could promote respect
for the obligations of the United States under the international refugee treaties.

status and asylum. Among the criteria proposed is: "Punishment for conscientious objection to military service may be persecution on account of political opinion or religious
belief. . . ." Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Petition to the Department of Justice Seeking a Rule on Substantive Eligibility Criteria for Refugee Status and Asylum at
20 (1991) (on file with author). As of this writing, no action has been taken by the
Justice Department on the petition.

